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Current Statutory and Case Law
Developments in Historic Preservation
FRANK B. GILBERT*
On June 26, 1978, the definition of an expert in historic
preservation law changed; it became "a person who has read
Justice Brennan's opinion in the Penn Central Case."' Today,
historic preservation has a status that has been made secure by
the Supreme Court.
It is a very special moment for me to come back to New
York where, starting in 1965, I worked on the development of a
comprehensive historic preservation program. In 1965, a fre-
quent comment from some lawyers was, "Good luck. You're un-
constitutional. You won't last six months."2 Of course, there
were also many lawyers who were supportive, giving their time
and talent to our work and goals.
The goals we started with have been exceeded. The program
has continued to grow and serve the city, its neighborhoods, and
its people. My thoughts go back to the spring of 1966 when the
New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission sent a reg-
istered letter to the New York Central saying that Grand Cen-
tral would be considered for landmark designation. Grand Cen-
tral Terminal became a member of my family. I heard about its
plans for growth, its engagement to an English developer, and
the dowry he was bringing with him. I worried about the physi-
cal condition of the Terminal. For many years its parents had
treated it like a poor relation. As in many other families, we en-
ded up in court. First we were in the New York State Supreme
Court;3 then we appealed to a second court;4 next a third court
looked at the controversy;5 finally we reached another Supreme
Court.6 These family disputes are now behind us. Penn Central
is going to be a symbol of a new and creative use of law.
While future plans are being developed, keep in mind the
legislative and judicial background of historic preservation law
over the last fifty years. In 1931, in Charleston, South Carolina,
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zoning provided the basis for governmental action to preserve
the city's "old and historic district." When preservation provi-
sions were added to this zoning ordinance, Charleston estab-
lished procedures that have been followed in other cities. A sep-
arate review board was created to protect designated areas by
issuing certificates of appropriateness. An architect and other
experts comprised a majority of this board which reviewed
changes to exterior architectural features visible to the public
from a public street.7
The emphasis in that ordinance was on work initiated by
property owners; the board responded when owners decided to
spend money on their buildings and prepared plans. While
landmark and historic district commissions are interested in the
maintenance and rehabilitation of historic buildings, so far they
have not initiated programs that impose maintenance responsi-
bilities on owners beyond the usual city requirement that prop-
erty be kept in good repair.
Local commissions do face a problem in keeping the public
interested in the work they do. Their success requires the careful
review of many small changes to historic buildings. Gaining and
retaining the confidence of property owners depends on reaching
them before they spend money on unapproved and inappropri-
ate plans. In addition, owners and architects want to know what
is expected of them. Note a particular paragraph in the current
Charleston ordinance:
In order to provide guidance and insight into desirable goals
and objectives for the old city district and the old and historic
Charleston districts or for desirable types of development, and for
the maintenance of consistent policies in guiding the building
public towards better standards of design, the board of architec-
tural review shall maintain a file containing records of all applica-
tions brought before the board for review, the action taken by the
board, drawings submitted and amendments of drawings ap-
proved pertaining thereto, and drawings and photographs or re-
productions thereof showing structures in authentic Charleston
character which, in its opinion, may serve as general guides to
appropriateness or as expressions of objectives to prospective de-
velopers or property owners.8
In 1936, the Vieux Carr6 District was established in New




eral court decisions that helped preservationists elsewhere.0
Other laws were passed including the one in 1955 creating the
Beacon Hill District.10 At the time, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court gave an advisory opinion that rejected many of
the objections to this type of law:
The announced purpose of the act is to preserve this historic sec-
tion [Beacon Hill] for the educational, cultural, and economic ad-
vantage of the public. If the General Court [the State Legislature]
believes that this object would be attained by the restrictions
which the act would place upon the introduction into the district
of inappropriate forms of construction that would destroy its
unique value and associations, a court can hardly take the view
that such legislative determination is so arbitrary or unreasonable
that it cannot be comprehended within the public welfare."
In the early days of historic preservation, some buildings
were saved from demolition by determined individuals and
groups. It was good to have a few laws on the books, but those
first ordinances were not the means by which major buildings
were saved.
Until the 1960s, there were few law suits involving historic
preservation. Then favorable precedents were established in
states like New Mexico, New York, Illinois, California and Ma-
ryland. Usually. the preservation of the historic building or dis-
trict was a popular cause locally, and the courts were comforta-
ble in upholding preservation laws when some element of a
statute was attacked.
A thoughtful review of historic preservation was made in
1975 by a federal court of appeals in Maher v. City of New Or-
leans. 2 At the start of its opinion, the court recognized that the
issues in the case "carry implications of nationwide import."13
This acknowledgement of the importance of historic preserva-
tion appears in many court decisions and has helped in gaining
acceptance from judges in later cases.
Preservationists who will want their work to continue to be
respected by courts must support ordinances which are carefully
drawn. Lawyers representing municipal commissions and other
preservationists can help by establishing and maintaining fair
procedures and by making certain that a full record is developed




In the Maher case, the court's conclusion sustained this
approach:
The Vieux Carr6 Ordinance was enacted to pursue the legitimate
state goal of preserving the "tout ensemble" of the historic
French Quarter. The provisions of the Ordinance appear to con-
stitute permissible means adapted to secure that end. Further-
more, the operations of the Vieux Carr6 Commission satisfy due
process standards in that they provide reasonable legislative and
practical guidance to, and control over, administrative decision
making."
The court outlined the elements which ensured that the local
commission had adequate guidance in the exercise of its admin-
istrative judgment: the detailed provisions of the ordinance, the
membership of the commission ("architects, historians and busi-
ness persons offering complementary skills, experience and in-
terests"), the decision-making and appeal process itself, and the
data used by the Commission - architectural surveys and re-
search data, including old city plans, documents, photographs
and contemporary writings. The court summarized by stating
that "firm steps have been undertaken here to assure that the
Commission would not be adrift to act without standards in an
impermissible fashion."' 15
In Figarsky v. Historic District Commission,16 the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court upheld a local commission's order which pre-
vented particular owners from demolishing their historic build-
ing. The court saw the need to evaluate alternatives:
The plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the historic district
commission acted illegally, arbitrarily, in a confiscatory manner or
in abuse of discretion. This the plaintiffs failed to do. The plain-
tiffs went no further than to present evidence that their house
was unoccupied and in need of extensive repairs. There was no
evidence offered that the house, if repaired, would not be of some
value, or that the proximity of the McDonald's hamburger stand
rendered the property of practically no value as a part of the his-
toric district.17
In the future, some owners applying for demolition will be
more thorough in their presentations. That obligation to evalu-
ate alternatives to demolition and to look more closely at his-
toric buildings and their sites is a major improvement caused by




ments had been quick to tear down buildings without any real
plans for their replacements. Preservationists now have a mech-
anism to educate their community through hearings and, at the
same time, to prepare alternatives for serious consideration."8
The Connecticut opinion illustrates the tasks that face an
historic district commission. Courts will sustain a well-prepared
decision by a commission. Prior to its decision on the demolition
application, this local commission received extensive testimony,
including information from the state historic preservation office.
The court was impressed by the reasonable exercise of judgment
by the local commission.1
From its start in the south, historic preservation has grown:
today, designated landmarks and historic districts are found
everywhere. Programs exist in places where tradition and inter-
est in history are not nearly as great as they are in Charleston,
New Orleans and Boston. A combination of federal, state and
local laws has helped to make historic preservation programs
constructive and effective. The steps taken by government are
responses to energetic and persistent individuals who have made
a strong case for preserving historic buildings and areas and pro-
tecting them from unnecessary changes.
At the municipal level, support for historic preservation is
impressive. More than 600 cities and towns have passed local
landmark or historic ordinances, a large increase from 1965,
when there were fewer than 100 municipal preservation laws.2
Thousands of legislators have voted for the enactment of these
ordinances.21
Encouraged by federal legislation, all the state governments
have established preservation offices that have undertaken
building surveys, National Register evaluations, reviews of pro-
posed Federal actions and project analyses under 1976 tax
amendments. The matching grants to local projects have made it
possible to complete the rehabilitation of some historic build-
ings. State preservation legislation is being studied in several
states in order to see what additional responsibilities may be
given to preservation offices. For example, in some states the
government might encourage counties to protect landmarks in
unincorporated areas.
At the federal level, the National Register of Historic Places




preservation. Americans do pay attention to experts. In cities all
over -the country there is an awareness of which buildings are on
the National Register. A determination that a building is of Na-
tional Register quality is sent to the state capital and then to
Washington for confirmation, and it comes back much stronger
than when it left.
Before there was a National Register, the merits of
threatened buildings were often debated. Today, there are still
some public debates over the quality of buildings, but people
have forgotten how much more time and energy were spent on
this type of argument in the past. After the creation of the Na-
tional Register, thousands of properties were listed with a mini-
mum of objections. It is true that new listings are now, once
again, more controversial because of activities of the Advisory
Council and some provisions in the 1976 tax amendments.
With the passage of the preservation provisions in the Tax
Reform Act of 1976,22 the federal government did provide equal
treatment for old buildings matching the encouragement given
to the developers of new structures.2 The tax incentives for re-
habilitation go beyond the use of the police power for preserva-
tion and the early tradition of philanthropy that led to the sav-
ing of historic homes.24
Government agencies in the 1950s and 1960s, as represented
by the highway and urban renewal administrators, often ap-
peared to be recruiting agents for local preservation groups. To-
day, there is still vocal dissatisfaction with federal efforts to pro-
tect historic buildings from destruction. When other people's
plans and priorities prevail, preservationists wonder how effec-
tive federal intervention is.
Federal departments have been taken to court, and feder-
ally-aided projects have been the subject of litigation.25 Today
much more attention is paid to procedural requirements, al-
though administrators may still not make the extra effort in-
volved to fit historic buildings into their plans.
It is easier for the courts when officials try to avoid meeting
procedural requirements. Progress on a proposed project was
stopped in such a situation:
Residents of the Green Springs section of Louisa County, Vir-
ginia, appeal from a denial of their application for an injunction




center in their neighborhood until the requirements of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National His-
toric Preservation Act (NHPA) have been met. The district
court-ruling that the state had permissibly transferred federal
funds from the penal center to other state projects, and finding
no significant federal contact with the center-dismissed the
complaint. While we conclude that the facts do not establish that
the center has become an irrevocably federal project, we never-
theless hold that if it is to be constructed without compliance
with federal environmental Acts, the state must reimburse the
federal government for sums initially allocated to the center, but
subsequently diverted to other state projects. 26
In a recent case, a federal court of appeals summed up the
intent of Congress:
The sum and substance of all this is, we think, a congressional
purpose, expanding over the years, to make certain that federal
agencies give weight to the impact of their activities on historic
preservation. 7
At the local level, preservation activities face opposition
from municipal departments with well-established priorities. An
encouraging sign is the ability of preservationists to develop re-
lationships with other city agencies and to shape their plans for
historic buildings so that programs in housing, neighborhood
conservation, and commercial revitalization are given assistance.
The need for governmental cooperation on a local level ex-
tends as well to higher levels of government. At least one court
has been helpful on this question in a situation involving county
property:
Secondly, to accomplish the primary purposes of historic area
zoning, it is necessary that the exterior of the building having his-
toric or architectural value be preserved against destruction or
substantial impairment by every one, whether a private citizen or
a governmental body. In short, the historically or architecturally
valuable building is just as much lost by destruction by a public
body as it would be by a private owner. The facts in the present
case should lay to rest the notion that public bodies--as con-
trasted with private owners-would not be likely to press for
demolition of buildings having established historic or architec-
tural value. The General Assembly could well conclude that, to
accomplish historic and architectural preservation, the jurisdic-




vate persons or governmental agencies. Otherwise, the primary
purpose of the legislation would be frustrated.28
With many landmarks and historic districts identified and
designated, some preservation issues are disposed of in an or-
derly way. However, there are still last-minute efforts, including
attempts to get delays through government action:
On March 19, 1973, thirty-eight days after appellee applied for a
building permit, the City Council passed a resolution prohibiting
the Chief Building Inspector from issuing building permits in the
PD-19 area until such time as the matter of historic preservation
was resolved....
Our holding in this case should not be construed so as to au-
thorize a city's carte blanche denial of building permits anytime it
contemplates changing the zoning in a given area. However, when
as here, a city has placed its zoning machinery in operation before
the permit is applied for and the impetus of the proposed new
zoning is directed at and brought about by concern over the fu-
ture general welfare of a particular area, i.e., Swiss Avenue, then
we do not feel that the city's action in maintaining the status quo
for a reasonable time until the rezoning can be completed can be
considered as an arbitrary or capricious or unreasonable exercise
of its police power.9
Following this delay an historic district was established in
the Swiss Avenue neighborhood. A similar result was obtained in
New Orleans where a series of demolition moratorium ordi-
nances were passed to protect buildings within the central busi-
ness district. The laws were related to land use studies that were
being made, and each ordinance applied for a limited period of
time. Thus, the city council reviewed the situation before ex-
tending the moratorium which eventually lasted nearly four
years.
While the ordinances were in effect, owners were able to ob-
tain demolition permits by appealing to the city council and
showing hardship or definite plans to construct new buildings on
the sites to be cleared. After its studies were completed, the city
established a central business district historic district.30
Many local landmark and historic district laws need amend-
ment to strengthen municipal preservation programs. In some
cities, the next step would be a longer delay period during which




tion. When a twelve-month delay is provided, an owner takes
more seriously the interest in preserving an historic building.
Part of the public expects more results from preservation laws
than some commissions can deliver with the powers they have. 1
At the same time, the expansion of historic preservation ac-
tivities has affected more property owners and has led to close
examination of existing laws and their implementation. Many
owners argue that these laws should not apply to them. Because
of court decisions favorable to historic preservation, these critics
are making their arguments to legislators.
In spite of that shift in emphasis, courts will continue to be
asked to review the implementation of historic preservation pro-
grams. Factual, economic and administrative issues will be em-
phasized by opponents and their lawyers. Litigation will involve
whether a building or area qualifies as historic, whether proper
procedures have been followed, and whether the alternatives to
demolition and other changes are acceptable. Preservationists
will continue to bring suits trying to get courts to intervene in
projects where there is a relationship to the federal government.
A review of laws and cases does show the acceptance of his-
toric preservation as a factor in public and private decisions.
Property owners and public officials have modified the way his-
toric buildings are treated. The development of historic preser-
vation law has been impressive, and this new field has helped




Current Statutory and Case Law
Developments in Historic Preservation
FRANK B. GILBERT
* LL.B., 1957, Harvard Law School; A.B., 1952, Harvard University; Chief Counsel,
Landmarks and Preservation Law, National Trust for Historic Preservation; formerly
Secretary and Executive Director of the New York City Landmarks Preservation
Commission.
1. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Justice Brennan
continues to speak out on issues of importance to historic preservation. In a recent land
use case, San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), he delivered a
dissenting opinion for four members of the Court. A fifth member of the Court, Justice
Rehnquist, concurred in the disposition of the case on jurisdictional grounds but agreed
with "much of what is said" in the Brennan dissent. Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissent
in the Penn Central case.
In the San Diego Gas case, Justice Brennan warns against "arbitrary or excessive"
use of the police power that then becomes a taking of property. "Police power regula-
tions such as zoning ordinances and other land-use restrictions can destroy the use and
enjoyment of property in order to promote the public good just as effectively as formal
condemnation or physical invasion of property." Id. at 652 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
Along with this warning, Justice Brennan refers back to the satisfactory standard in
the Penn Central case that an owner must be able to make "reasonable beneficial use of
the landmark site" and must have "opportunities further to enhance" this site and other
properties. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
In order to retain the confidence of the public and the support of elected officials,
landmark and historic district commissions have always had to be sensitive to the needs
of property owners. In addition, the commission must respond successfully to economic
problems that may arise. At the end of the Penn Central case, Justice Brennan had said,
".... [I]f appellants can demonstrate at some point in the future that circumstances
have so changed such that the Terminal ceases to be 'economically viable,' appellants
may obtain relief." Id. at 138 n. 36.
2. It is instructive to recall the mood of inevitability when the plans for the new
building at Grand Central were announced. After referring to a newspaper photograph of
the proposed 2,000,000-square-foot building, the New Yorker magazine said, "The ac-
companying story seems to make it clear that neither zoning regulations nor the City
Planning Commission nor the Landmarks Preservation Commission nor any uprising of
maddened standees on the 5:07 to Larchmont had the power or energy to put a stop to
the project." NEW YORKER, June 29, 1968, at 23.
3. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 50 A.D.2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20
(1st Dep't 1975) which overturned the judgment and order of the N.Y. State Supreme
Court, New York County, in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, N.Y.L.J., Jan.
23, 1975 at 16, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. New York County).
4. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 50 A.D.2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1st
Dep't 1975).
5. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y. 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977).
6. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
7. The board originally had five members. Today there are two additional members
19811
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who are not required to have professional qualifications but who "have demonstrated
outstanding interest and knowledge in historical or architectural development within the
City." CHARLESTON, S.C., CITY CODE § 54-26.
Because of the neighborhood and development issues in which these boards become
involved, mayors now include a wider range of persons on landmark and historic district
commissions. Under the historic conservation legislation adopted in Cincinnati in May,
1980, the historic conservation board shall "facilitate the implementation of measures
which further conservation and development of historic structures and districts by pri-
vate and public persons, including coordination of actions required of various city de-
partments," and shall "act as a catalyst to expedite the flow of projects through depart-
ments and agencies." CINCINNATI, OHIO, ADMIN. CODE art. II, § 13.
8. CHARLESTON, S.C., CITY CODE § 54-28.
9. See Friedmann, The Vieux Carr: The Administration of Municipal Laws, 1
Pace L. Rev. 585 (1981).
10. 1955 Mass. Acts, ch. 616, § 1.
11. Opinion of Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 783, 787, 128 N.E.2d 563, 566-67
(1955).
12. 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976).
13. Id. at 1053.
14. Id. at 1067. The North Carolina Supreme Court approved the "tout ensemble"
principle as it upheld the inclusion of a vacant lot within an historic district: "It is
widely recognized that preservation of the historic aspects of a district requires more
than simply the preservation of those buildings of historical and architectural signifi-
cance within the district. . . .This 'tout ensemble' doctrine, as it is now often termed, is
an integral and reasonable part of effective historic district preservation." A-S-P Assoc.
v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 216, 258 S.E.2d 444, 451 (1979).
15. Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1062 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 905 (1976). In an earlier footnote, the court had given a warning that is applica-
ble to other commissions: "[W]e pause to note that past enforcement of the Ordinances
does not seem to have been uniformly predictable." Id. at 1061 n.57. Preservation ordi-
nances often call for a commission to prepare guidelines at the time of designation. See,
e.g., CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 741-7, 741-11.
16. 171 Conn. 198, 368 A.2d 163 (1976).
17. Id. at 212, 368 A.2d at 171-72 (citation omitted). In a recent Missouri decision,
the court used "the reasoning generally applied in historic district demolition cases,"
stating that "the landowner must not only establish that he cannot economically utilize
the property but that it is impractical to sell or lease it, or that no market exists for it at
a reasonable price." The opinion added "the city has supplied some testimony that the
property was of a value in excess of the amount expended by the church to acquire title."
Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Board of Adjustment, 599 S.W.2d 61, 65, 67 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980).
18. In rejecting a possible attack on constitutional grounds, the New York State
Court of Appeals attached significance to a landmark commission's opportunity to pre-
pare alternative plans. "Although we note that the challenge here is not to the facial
validity of the statute, such a challenge would be to no avail because of the ameliorative
provisions of section 207-8.0 which contains a number of alternative methods by which
the Commission may seek to devise a scheme so that the impediments to the owner's
earning a reasonable return, created by landmark designation, may be offset by other
pecuniary benefits." Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 455, 415 N.E.2d
922, 925, 434 N.Y.S.2d 932, 935-36 (1980).
19. When an historic district commission had not given the evidence related to its
decision, a Maryland court remanded to the commission a case brought by an owner who
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had been denied permission to install redwood siding over a brick facade within the
district. The court said: "The record must disclose the facts on which the commission
acted and a statement of the reasons for its actions. Without such a record the reviewing
court cannot perform its duty of determining whether the action of the Commission was
arbitrary or capricious." Fout v. Frederick Historic District Commission, Misc. No. 4005
(Frederick Cty. Cir. Ct. Feb. 5, 1980).
20. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978). At the
start of the majority opinion, Justice Brennan refers to the many state and local historic
preservation laws. This reference is an early indication of his eventual conclusion on the
constitutionality of the law under attack.
21. See Robinson, Historic Preservation Law: The Metes and Bounds of a New
Field, 1 PACE L. REv. 511 (1981).
22. Tax Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
23. "Although tax considerations are only a part of the total financial equation, it is
evident that the Internal Revenue Code in the past has done little to encourage preserva-
tion in the private preservation efforts. I do not mean to suggest that those who drafted
the code consciously intended to frustrate preservation activities, but some provisions in
the code are clearly intended as incentives for new construction and others simply have
the effect. Unfortunately, an incentive for new construction is very often a disincentive
for preservation." CAPLIN, Federal Tax Policy as an Incentive for Enhancement of the
Built Environment, in TAx IN ENTIVEs FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION 9 (G. Andrews, ed.
1980).
24. At the end of 1980, nearly 2,000 rehabilitation projects had been approved by
the Department of the Interior and thus qualified for the favorable tax treatment under
the 1976 amendments.
25. See, e.g., Central Okla. Preservation Alliance v. Oklahoma City Urban Renewal
Auth., 471 F. Supp. 68 (W.D. Okla. 1979); Hall County Historical Soc'y v. Georgia Dep't
of Transp., 447 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
26. Ely v. Velde, 497 F.2d 252, 253-54 (4th Cir. 1974) (footnote omitted).
27. W.A.T.C.H. v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310, 325 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Water-
bury Urban Renewal Agency v. W.A.T.C.H., 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
28. Mayor of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel County, 271 Md. 265, 291-92 316 A.2d 807,
821 (1974). That type of argument was also made in a dissenting opinion in a case in-
volving property in downtown Seattle that was part of the original campus of the Uni-
versity of Washington and is still owned by it. The city's Landmarks Preservation Board
had wanted to designate a commercial building. While the university had no present
demolition plans, it opposed the action of the board. The Washington Supreme Court
held that the city had no power to make this designation. State v. City of Seattle, 94
Wash. 2d 162, 163, 615 P.2d 461, 464 (1980).
The court said that the legislature had given the University Board of Regents full
control over the property including the power to raze, reconstruct, alter or remodel
buildings it owned. The decision was based on the language of a statute, and the court
declined to apply a rule of immunity that would exempt state property from city regula-
tions unless the state legislature specifically provided otherwise. Id. at 162, 615 P.2d at
461.
29. City of Dallas v. Crownrich, 506 S.W.2d 654, 655-56, 660 (Tex. 1974).
30. In adopting the first ordinance, the city noted that there had been "an inordi-
nate amount of demolition" in the central business district that in most cases had not
resulted in new construction and that had led to an extensive amount of open space.
New Orleans, La., Ordinance No. 5409 M.C.S. The other ordinances were Nos. 5616,




31. A recent ordinance in the District of Columbia goes further than many laws. It
authorizes the city government to deny permits for the demolition of historic buildings
and brings important factors into these decisions. (Under an earlier law, permits could
be delayed for 180 days to permit negotiations with the owners). Now a request demoli-
tion permit may not be issued "unless the Mayor finds that the issuance of the permit is
necessary in the public interest, or that failure to issue a permit will result in unreasona-
ble economic hardship to the owner." The phrase "unreasonable economic hardship" is
defined to mean "that failure to issue a permit would amount to a taking of the owner's
property without just compensation or, in the case of a low-income owner(s) as deter-
mined by the Mayor, failure to issue a permit would place an onerous and excessive
financial burden upon such owner(s)." When the mayor finds demolition necessary "to
allow the construction of a project of special merit," a demolition permit cannot be is-
sued "unless a permit for new construction is issued simultaneously ... and the owner
demonstrates the ability to -complete the project." District of Columbia Historic
Landmark and Historic District Protection Act, D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 25, §§ 5(e), 3(n),
5(h) (1978).
Perspectives of a Landmark Owner
STEPHEN DITTMAN
* J.D., 1976, Villanova Law School; B.A., 1972, Harvard University; currently Assis-
tant Counsel, Pennsylvania State Department of Transportation.
1. Since a petition for certiorari is still pending before that Court, it would not be
appropriate to comment on that decision at this time.
2. See Preservation of Landmarks and Historical Districts, NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE ANN. ch. 8-a, §§ 205-1.0 to 207.-21.0 (Williams 1976 & Supp. 1981). See also NEw
YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION, art. I, ch. 2, §12-10 & art. VII, ch. 4, §§ 74-79 to 74-793
(1981).
3. In essence, through the definition of a zoning lot, New York City has made it
possible to sell the unused air space above an existing structure to the owner or lessor of
a contiguous lot. Therefore, to the extent there is unused airspace above a landmark, the
owners of the landmark can sell the right to build. As a result, the buyer of "transferable
development rights" can increase the size of a building contiguous to the landmark. See
2 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING §34.0 (2) -.05 (3) (4th ed. 1981).
4. The Landmarks Preservation Commission is the entity with the'power to enforce
and police the laws relating to preservation of landmarks in New York City. NEW YORK,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN., supra note 2; NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER ANN. § 534 (Williams
1976).
5. A landmark is defined as, "[any improvement, any part of which is thirty years
old or older, which has a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or
value as part of the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the city, state or
nation and which has been designated as a landmark pursuant to the provisions of this
chapter." NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN., supra note 2 at § 207-1.0(n).
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